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DISCERNING MOTIVE: ANOTHER LOOK AT 
TROLLOPE’S WARDEN
Kevin Floyd
University of Iowa
Septimus Harding, The Worden's meek little protagonist who has 
the habit of playing an imaginary cello whenever he gets nervous (and 
he gets nervous frequently), is one of Anthony Trollope’s more 
endearing characters. The amount of critical commentary written about 
him indicates that he is also one of the more fascinating. Critics have 
collectively identified two primary dilemmas which face Harding, two 
possible motives for his resignation of the wardenship, which 
constitutes the novel’s climax. One is the questioning that awakens in 
him of whether he has a right to the income he receives, and the other 
is the simple desire for peace, for an end to the argument and turmoil. 
Harding is questioning the justice of his position for the first time in 
his life, but he is also drowning in unpleasantness, the existence of 
which traumatizes his nervous soul. Commentary on The Warden has 
emphasized the former of these motives almost exclusively. Harding 
has been interpreted primarily as an ethical character, a character whose 
conscience drives him to do what is just, and this in the face of much 
hostile opposition. He has been called “the purest of Trollope’s 
clergymen” (Letwin 232), a character of “steadfast belief in what is 
right” who “refus[es] to subscribe to what is wrong” (Smith 132). 
More than one critic has considered him nothing short of heroic, and 
many, including A. O. J. Cockshut, author of the influential Anthony 
Trollope: A Critical Study, have considered this heroism self-evident.
If we were to discover, however, that Harding’s primary desire is 
simply for an end to the unpleasantness, and that the ethical delimma is 
secondary, Harding would begin to seem less the man of integrity that 
he has previously been considered. And this is in fact what I will 
argue: Harding’s motive is less the agitating drive of his conscience 
than a simple longing for the quiet that an end to the controversy will 
bring about.
Cockshut’s attitude is typical; the majority of critics have 
considered Harding’s motivation to be so unquestionably ethical that 
they have neglected to examine it. But a few who share this opinion 
have taken a less careless look. Such critics as Ruth apRoberts, 
Sherman Hawkins, and Dayton Haskin have argued that Harding is 
more morally just, or at least more human, than Grantly and Bold (who 
are the representative figures of the opposing factions and characters 
with whom Harding is clearly contrasted); Grantly and Bold, they argue,
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base their judgments on rigid, scientific systems of principle, whereas 
Harding, on the other hand, “is a man of feeling” (Hawkins 210). 
apRoberts points out, in fact, that Harding embodies situation ethics in 
that he succeeds in deciding for himself what is just rather than 
allowing scientific, inflexible systems to decide for him (19). (This 
obvious conflict with Grantly and Bold is certainly part of the reason 
Harding is so widely considered heroic.) apRoberts believes that 
Harding’s motivation is, for the course of the novel, “disinterested 
virtue” (21) and calls Harding “as beneficient a man as we can imagine” 
(17). Unlike apRoberts, Hawkins admits that Harding’s motivation 
begins as a desire for simple tranquility; however he still maintains that 
this attitude evolves into a desire to do what is just. Harding’s “moral 
strength begins in weakness: he cannot bear to be misjudged and at 
first conceives his resignation as an escape from an uncomfortable 
position” (211). However, when he actually takes that step at the end, 
“he does what he has long desired, but does it now because it is right. 
The evolution through uneasiness and mental anguish to moral 
recognition is slow, but it is an evolution and not a reversal” (212). If, 
as Hawkins implies, Harding’s embodiment of situation ethics is a very 
result of his lack of a system of principle, perhaps that is why it takes 
negative press to start him contemplating the justice of his income—a 
decade after he begins receiving it.
Haskin also asserts Harding’s concern with justice, but his 
assertion is a more qualified one. Instead of truly examining the 
situation for himself, Harding sees only the two possible alternatives 
pointed out to him by Grantly and by the Jupiter: remaining in the 
position as before, or unequivocally resigning the position and 
sentencing himself to a life of comparative poverty. Haskin argues that 
Harding fails to give enough thought to ways in which he could give 
up the post and still avoid poverty, such as exchanging positions with 
Quiverful or living with the Bishop. Haskin interprets this attitude as 
resulting from a “somewhat masochistic desire to expiate his guilt” 
(50); i.e., Harding is harder on himself than the situation calls for. But 
sentencing himself to poverty will also end the controversy 
unequivocally; what Haskin calls “masochistic desire” is actually a 
desire on Harding’s part to put an end to the media attention that 
torments him by taking an action that outside forces such as the Jupiter 
cannot help being satisfied with. This action is as little an attempt to 
“expiate his guilt” and as much an attempt to appease, to put an end to 
the negative light in which he is seen, as is giving to the beadsmen out 
of his own pocket an extra twopence a day when the controversy 
originated (12). At any rate, Haskin appears also to consider Harding
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heroic, although he is the only one of these scholars never to actually 
use the word “hero” and to acknowledge the possibility of flaws in 
Harding.
But an opinion that takes a radically different view of Trollope’s 
meek little hero is the one expressed in an article that has become one 
of the most quoted pieces of Warden criticism, M. A. Goldberg’s 
discussion of the novel as “A Commentary on the Age of Equipoise.” 
Goldberg’s article is one of the earliest—and still one of the few—to 
state that questions of justice have little to do with Harding’s decision 
to resign the wardenship: “True, [Harding] speaks of an awakened 
conscience, but this is a conscience more nudged than aroused, for his 
resignation is aimed at removing himself from attack, not at alleviating 
wrongs” (384). Many, if not most, critics who refer to this article 
make little mention of Goldberg’s obvious suspicion of Harding. 
Haskin is one of these. Goldberg and the other critics I have cited are in 
fact at poles—Goldberg calls Harding non-heroic (386). And more 
recently, Thomas Langford has said, with regard to Chapter Eleven, in 
which Eleanor is referred to as “Iphigenia” and Harding as 
“Agamemnon,” that Harding actually bears little similarity to the 
Achaean ruler. “He is, in fact, the opposite of the old Greek Warrior 
king. Indecisive and lacking courage, he wishes only to enjoy peace 
and quiet ....He simply resigns the battlefield and gives over his post in 
favor of peace” (439). Langford is, along with Goldberg, one of the few 
critics to suggest, at least, that Harding may be something less than a 
“hero.”
All of these critics should be commended for engaging in some 
kind of examination of Harding’s motives, a task most critics of the 
novel have neglected, a task essential to our understanding of it. Yet all 
of these generalizations are lopsided. I will admit that Goldberg in 
particular is excessively critical, not even allowing that ethical issues 
are one of Harding’s concerns (383). Harding is neither the hero that 
the former group makes him out to be nor the villain that the latter 
group tries to make him. No one will deny that Harding dislikes 
turmoil; and neither will I accept the claim Goldberg makes, that 
Harding is unconcerned about ethical issues. The difficult question, 
again, is which of these two principal sentiments—the desire for justice 
or the desire for tranquility—is the more powerful part of his 
motivation. None of the above-mentioned critics attempt what I will 
attempt here: a close examination of the forces that cause Harding to 
act.
Both concerns are strong in Harding, and in fact, if we simply 
examine the degree of voice he gives to each of these concerns, it is
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almost impossible to tell which one of them is dominant. We are told 
that Harding asks himself, “Was John Hiram’s will fairly carried out? 
That was the true question,” and that “he was not so anxious to prove 
himself right as to be so” (32). But we are also told that “he felt that 
he would give almost anything—much more than he knew he ought 
to—to relieve himself from the storm which he feared was coming” 
(54), that he would have done so “from the sheer love of quiet” (55). 
We are told that “what [Harding] could not endure was that he should be 
accused by others, and not acquitted by himself ” (91, my italics). But 
we are also told that he is terrified of being “dragged forth into the 
glaring day and gibbeted before ferocious multitudes” (9). After 
examining such evidence, it is far from clear which of these two 
concerns of Harding is the dominant one. He seems, in fact, to make 
little or no distinction between these two motives in his own mind. 
But even if one of them did seem dominant in the amount of voice 
Harding gives to it, this kind of “evidence” would not really be evidence 
at all—it is fallacious, for reasons I will emphasize below.
In order to discern, then, which motive is dominant in Harding, we 
must attempt as best we can to look at the actions Harding takes, to 
follow the path of his thinking, and to analyze the fluctuations of his 
attitudes throughout his ordeal. We must look at those forces which are 
acting on him at critical points in the path leading to his decision.
Harding first appears to move toward a resolution of some sort 
(instead of simply moping) in Chapter Nine, “The Conference.” At 
first, he primarily seems to want to escape turmoil and secondarily to 
figure out the justice, or lack thereof, of his position. During the 
interview with Grantly he broods over the Jupiter article: “Was he to 
be looked on as the unjust griping priest he had been there described?” 
And he complains to the archdeacon, “Could you tell me to sit there at 
ease, indifferent, and satisfied while such things as these are said of me 
loudly in the world?” (88) He makes Grantly see that what he wants is 
to escape the pain, but his perceptive son-in-law convinces him that he 
must endure. So now, the unpleasantness-question taken care of for the 
(very brief) time being, Harding is left asking himself the ethical 
question. He is extremely depressed until he is attracted to Eleanor’s 
scheme to escape altogether (98-99). But he changes his mind again 
and tells Eleanor he must stand firm in the face of criticism and bear the 
misery (100). Here he is telling his daughter just what Grantly told 
him. He admits that he does not exactly believe Grandy’s statements, 
but he is, nevertheless, controlled by them, “by a sense of duty, which, 
though he could not understand it, he was fain to acknowledge” (100). 
But then in Chapter Thirteen, when he sees the article in the Jupiter, he
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once again decides that he wants to give up his position because he 
believes that every word of the article is true (124-125).
It would appear from this information that Harding is unable to 
resist any persuasion he comes in contact with, that if he has any free 
will, he certainly does not exercise it—a conclusion that would 
contradict arguments for his heroism. However, before we draw such a 
conclusion, we should look closely at the final scene between Harding 
and Grantly in London, in which Harding appears to be resisting, 
finally, the will of others and asserting his own. To begin with, 
Harding is still not willing to admit to his son-in-law that he “gave 
him the slip” (173). If Harding is less intimidated by his son-in-law 
and is for the first time in the dominant position, it is only because 
Grandy’s relative position has changed; he is now the one doing the 
asking.
“Come, warden, promise me this,” he begs. Grantly is not as 
threatening as he has been earlier in the novel because he is more 
distressed and less confident than at any point previously. The only 
reason to believe that the warden would be as adamant if Grandy were 
in better control of his emotions is the distinct possibility that after 
wavering, Harding realizes that the act he has been driven to signals the 
end of his torment. The warden does not have the self-assurance of one 
who has confidently, heroically made a disinterested ethical decision; 
instead he simply answers “very, very meekly” the questions that are 
put to him (174).
However, the next morning Harding is, admittedly, more adamant, 
more determined. “The tamest animal will turn when driven too hard, 
and even Mr. Harding was beginning to fight for his own way” (178). 
But we must remember that he has the previous evening gone the 
distance, as it were, with his son-in-law, if “very, very meekly,” and 
this, presumably, for the first time in his life. Therefore, it seems that 
if Harding is a dynamic character, he has not learned to make an ethical 
decision but only to stand up to his son-in-law; when mention is made 
of the “triumph in his heart,” we are told that what he is proud of is not 
the substance of the decision itself but rather the fact that he had “held 
his own purpose against that of his son-in-law, and manfully combatted 
against great odds” (183). Arthur Pollard, another of the “hero”-critics, 
himself refers to the resignation as “Mr. Harding’s single and ultimate 
act of independence” (56, my emphasis). And even in this sense the 
argument that Harding is a dynamic character is questionable: when 
asked by his daughter, Grantly’s wife, to delay his resignation, he 
admits that “if I waited till I got to Barchester, I might perhaps be 
prevented” (180).
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In Chapter Thirteen, Harding decides to go to London and resign 
before Grantly has a chance to stop him. This is a very significant 
detail. He realizes that the archdeacon can easily sway him, that he 
does not have an answer for the arguments he knows Grantly will 
wield. “There is a great deal of truth in all he says,” he tells Eleanor. 
“He argues very well, and I can’t always answer him; but there is an old 
saying, Nelly: ‘Everyone knows where his own shoe pinches!’ ” (126) 
But not only can Harding never answer Grandy’s arguments; he can 
never answer anyone’s arguments; his opinion is always that of 
whoever did the persuading most recently. And the pain of being 
persuaded in different directions has finally become too much to bear. 
His shoe has pinched long enough. So Harding escapes from Grantly 
in order to alleviate his own pain, which is caused by not only the 
public criticism, but also the pressure from Grandy himself. “But what 
will Dr. Grantly say?” asks Eleanor, and Harding answers, “Well, my 
dear, it can’t be helped. We shall be out at Crabtree then” (128, my 
emphasis). Not only will resigning end the public ridicule, but the 
move to Crabtree will conveniently remove the visibility of Grandy’s 
ridicule as well.
(And at this point we can see why, as I mentioned above, the 
relative amounts of voice Harding gives to the two different motives 
identified by previous critics would not even be reliable evidence of 
Harding’s motivation if we saw clear dominance of one priority over the 
other. The unpleasantness Harding complains of is only the distress 
caused him by the Jupiter. But Grantly is just as much a source of the 
pain Harding wants to alleviate. And why Harding does relatively little 
complaining of the stress the archdeacon causes him is obvious. The 
two kinds of concerns Harding verbaliz.es are in fact not evidence of 
anything.)
So Harding is anything but a “hero.” What most of these critics 
maintain is that Harding grows and finally reaches a moral decision by 
himself, independent of the abundant opinions of others. “The fact that 
strong pressures come from opposing directions,” says Haskin, “forces 
the warden to make a free choice. Nothing, ultimately, decides for him” 
(50). But to say that the existence of pressures “forces” Harding to 
make a “free choice” sounds like a contradiction in terms—primarily 
because it is. He really has no will of his own; he says, “I’m sure I 
ought not to remain here if I have nothing better to put forward than a 
quibble” (127), but the fact is that he never puts forth any argument at 
all. Nor, as I have already pointed out, does he answer the arguments 
made by others. His own meditations on his dilemma yield pain and 
little else. He does not think for himself or stand up for himself but
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rather wavers, though perhaps a better word might be “bounds,” because 
“wavers” implies that the force acting on the object (Harding) is within 
itself.
Harding’s “wavering” is rather the result of external forces; he is an 
inert old man who is tom between sophists, until he sees the chance to 
give his son-in-law the slip and escape in the only way possible. The 
Jupiter finally decides for him, only because something external finally 
has to. In this sense the plot of the novel is, as it were, faithful to the 
laws of physics; the pressure, the turmoil, the bounding back and forth 
steadily grows more intense until somehow the tension has to be 
relieved. Harding finally resigns as the only way to escape the 
pressures from the public and from Grantly. Escape is what motivates 
him. There is no moral growth and, therefore, there can be no final 
moral judgment.
A telling clue to Harding’s motivation is his reaction to the 
apparent regret of his resignation on the part of the beadsmen. Harding 
takes little responsibility for the new situation the beadsmen find 
themselves in; he expresses a kind of helpless regret, as though the 
negative results of his resignation are lamentable, but something he had 
little control over. His attitude is not that of a man who has made a 
moral decision that, although it has had some negative side effects, he 
is willing to take responsibility for, but of a man who, as a result of 
circumstances, has simply felt it best to give up. When he sits down 
with the beadsmen, he tells them, “I am sure you did not wish to turn 
me out, but I thought it best to leave you. I am not a very good hand 
at a lawsuit...” (194). So although he does not verbally blame them 
for what has happened, neither does he break the connection between 
their actions and the occupation he has lost.
And inconsistent with Harding’s alleged heroism is the novel’s 
symmetry, the fact that Trollope satirizes both sides of the novel’s 
controversy with equal relish, refraining from a show of favor for either 
side, as is made clear by, for one example of many, the Pessimist 
Anticant-Popular Sentiment section. Ross Murfin, one of many to 
make this argument, has said what is surely true, that the prevailing 
pattern of the novel is one of nonresolution, noncompromise, that “the 
novel’s central dilemma [goes] utterly unresolved” (22). And if the 
warden is caught in the middle, if he represents what Murfin calls the 
“gap” between these two sides, surely that gap has to be neutral, and a 
decision on the part of Harding even slightly in favor of the Jupiter's 
side of the issue detracts from the novel’s symmetry. If, however, 
Harding’s move is interpreted as motivated only by a desire for peace, 
he remains neutral and the symmetry of the novel remains intact. I
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alluded to this theory earlier with apRoberts, who has herself not only 
admitted, but eagerly declared, interestingly enough, that such 
symmetrical structure is not part of the novel but is the novel (17). 
And Haskin, whose argument in this light appears to be the more 
consistent one, bases his argument that Harding does make an ethical 
decision on his unique opinion that Trollope slightly favors Bold’s side 
of the issue (45).
Trollope creates in the reader a desire to excuse Harding. He depicts 
an ethically weak, if likeable character, and tests our discerning 
abilities. Critics have tried for years to emphasize an ethical resolution 
in Harding because he is more than endearing enough to receive the 
benefit of our doubts. He has been made into a “hero” when in fact he 
has only a limited, ultimately outweighed amount of ethical concern. 
What Trollope does with Harding is similar to but much less 
pronounced than what Shakespeare does with Jack Falstaff; he creates a 
character whose bad points ultimately outweigh his good ones, and then 
makes that character so likeable that the reader attempts to seek out 
redeeming qualities. While Falstaff is simply a very entertaining 
scoundrel, Trollope gives Harding a degree of moral concern, if an 
insufficient one, and makes the temptation to call him a “hero” almost 
irresistible.
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